22 March 1997
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html
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[Congressional Record: March 18, 1997 (Extensions)]
[Page E509]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr18mr97-50]
REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY
______
HON. BARNEY FRANK
of massachusetts
in the house of representatives
Tuesday, March 18, 1997
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, March 10, in
conjunction with our colleague, the gentleman from California, the
ranking Democrat on the National Security Committee, along with the
senior Senator from Oregon and the senior Senator from Minnesota, I
participated in a day long meeting on the implications of allowing the
military budget to stay at its current levels while trying to reduce
the Federal deficit to zero. The basic point that we and others made is
that unless we begin to make substantial reductions in the military
budget, we will devastate a number of other important social and
economic goals of our society by reducing Federal support for them to
an unacceptably low level.
But none of us would be for reducing American military spending if by
doing so we were going to put at risk our national security. Therefore,
we began the day with a discussion of the genuine needs of national
security today, and the highlight of that was a thoughtful, well
documented analysis of our national security situation presented by our
colleague from California who is the former chairman and current
ranking Democrat on the National Security Committee.
The gentleman from California who came to Congress in 1971, after
winning an election in which his criticism of the Vietnam War was a
central factor, has become one of the undisputed experts in the country
on national security policy. As my colleagues know, he combines a
strong passion with an extremely powerful analytic intelligence and the
result is an eloquent, forceful statement of the case for a more
realistic and comprehensive national security policy, one which would
allow us to save substantial resources from the military budget.
Mr. Speaker, because the need to reduce the military budget and make
funds available for important non-military purposes is the central
issue facing this Congress, I take the unusual step of seeking
permission to insert into the Record the extraordinarily thoughtful and
useful remarks of Mr. Dellums on that occasion, even though it exceeds
the normal length of remarks which are printed here. But with a
military budget in hundreds of billions, tens of billions more than it
needs to be, I believe that asking for the expenditure of a few hundred
dollars here to bring the case for reduction before the American people
is indeed a bargain.
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[Congressional Record: March 13, 1997 (Extensions)]
[Page E471-E474]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr13mr97-41]
ENVISIONING A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
______
HON. BARNEY FRANK
of massachusetts
in the house of representatives
Thursday, March 13, 1997
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for
printing in the Record:
[[Page E472]]
Envisioning a New National Security Strategy
(By Hon. Ronald V. Dellums)
The Cold War has been over now for several years.
Throughout that era, congressional colleagues told me: We
cannot make cuts in our military budget because of the world-
wide threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies.
Nonetheless, we believed then and we argued then that we
could reduce military spending and thereby help to ratchet
back the conflict. Indeed, throughout the last decade of the
Cold War, the Congressional Black Caucus proposed a series of
budgets to do precisely that.
With the Cold War over, many colleagues now say: With one-
third cuts in funding, force structure and personnel, we have
gone far enough in our post Cold War draw down. They say that
any more will leave us unable to respond to emerging
challenges because of hollow forces untrained and unequipped.
I say again, our current security environment both allows and
demands that we reallocate significant resources from our
military accounts, and redirect them into those domestic and
foreign policy accounts that contribute equally importantly
to our United States national security. Indeed, a strategy
that ignores the contributions to national security made by
foreign assistance and investments in education and science
research and development, just to name two domestic accounts,
is not a comprehensive strategy--and therefore it is one that
is doomed to fail.
Certainly instability and danger remain in various parts of
the world, including in Russia and other nations of the
former Soviet Union. Military modernization in China,
Southeast Asia, Latin America and elsewhere--including within
the United States--always should give pause for concern. The
Persian Gulf and Korean Peninsula merit continued attention
because of the possibilities for open warfare between
nations. Humanitarian crises and instability throughout the
globe will properly continue to require the involvement of
the U.S. military at least in the near term--preferably
through United Nations' sponsored undertakings in which the
United States acts as a colleague which can bring special
skills to the table. But we should not allow ourselves to be
trapped into the belief that these challenges, only partially
military in nature, represent anything requiring anywhere
near our current force structure or modernization plans.
Moreover, we should not view even these ``security''
challenges in purely military terms. They must be seen in
their economic, cultural and diplomatic frame of reference.
Seen in that light, much of the instability that threatens
human rights or outright bloodshed can be diminished and
deflected through a robust program of sustainable economic
development and timely diplomatic activity in behalf of
crisis intervention and conflict resolution. As I noted
throughout the Cold War, conflicts that are economic,
political, social and cultural in their origins cannot be
solved by resort to arms, but only by solving the underlying
economic, political, social and cultural origins of the
conflict.
Viewed this way, it is clear there exists an imbalance in
the funding of our three ``national security accounts.''
In one account, we continue to make a commitment to find
ways to finance a too-large military force structure, an
overly aggressive and in many cases misguided weapons
modernization program, and overly programmed requirements to
maintain short-term readiness (while not planning
successfully to pay for the involvement we will have in
peacekeeping and humanitarian ventures). We fail to pay for a
sufficient program of foreign assistance and much of what we
do pay for goes for military security assistance which often
compounds the problems that generate regional instability and
hostility, rather than ameliorate the root causes of that
instability. And, finally, we have already and continue to
sacrifice the necessary investments in education, science,
research and development, medical and infrastructure that
are absolutely critical to the national security of our
nation on the three-tiered alter of sustained military
spending, balanced federal budgets and generalized tax
breaks.
It is clear to me that significant spending reductions can
be achieved in our military account by a thoughtful
application of analysis to understanding the threats and
opportunities that great us in this new era. In this paper, I
seek to set out the justification for such reductions--
reductions which I believe represent both a down payment on
durable savings in the years beyond which we are currently
planning budgets and which will also shape and reduce the
military investments that will be made by other nations in
the future, especially including China and Russia.
I will leave it to others to more carefully lay out the
types of investments that could be made in both the foreign
assistance and domestic investments. But let me assert in
regard to both of them that fiscal investments in these
priorities will bear enormous leverage toward creating
international stability beyond our borders and to ensuring
that we have a healthy and vibrant society and polity within
our borders.
In other words, contrary to those who worry that we spend
too little on defense, I believe that our current level of
spending--far in excess of our most robust potential
adversary--is excessive and represents a long-term threat to
our national economy and to the integrity of the national
treasury and, therefore, to our national security.
The Military Funding ``Crisis''
Much of the discussion to date from the new Congressional
majority has centered on how to find equilibrium by an
increase in the funding side of the military requirements-
funding equation, rather than confronting whether or not the
program side might be overly robust and therefore excess to
our legitimate defense requirements. I believe, as I will set
out below, that we should focus on the program side of the
equation, and seek to find our equilibrium by scaling back
excessive force structure and formulating our modernization
effort to meet more appropriately the strategic challenges
that will confront us in tomorrow's world. Indeed, when
approached from that direction substantial savings can be
generated.
All of us--whatever our political viewpoint--should be able
to agree that the United States has not fully reconfigured
our forces or our thinking to meet the new realities of the
post-Cold War era. The disagreement is over how we can meet
them, what our strategy should be and what it will take to
implement that strategy. Only when we have answered these
questions can we proceed to assess the budgetary requirements
to fulfill that strategy.
My continued assessment of the type and scale of the
dangers that exist, the proper response to them and the role
of the United States in that response convinces me that we
can over the coming five-year defense planning period, and
prudence dictates that we should: first, make further
reductions in our nuclear arsenal and the infrastructure that
supports that arsenal; second weapons acquisition programs
that were undertaken to meet Cold War threats and which no
longer are required, or which are provocative and thereby
detrimental to U.S. interests in long-term stability; third,
reduce readiness requirements and plan to incorporate more
effectively reserve; forces in our military planning by
establishing less stringent planning requirements for
conflicts; and fourth, make further marginal force
reductions beyond those already projected, including in
intelligence accounts.
REDUCING THE NUCLEAR DANGER
The administration's Nuclear Posture Review failed to
realize savings that could be made by scaling back our
strategic arsenal. More recently, they have declined to
pursue opportunities with Russia to undertake START III
negotiations, which may prove essential to the Russian
ratification of the START II treaty. Former Strategic Command
Commander-in-Chief General Butler has quite appropriately
shoved the debate over downsizing (towards elimination) of
our arsenals right on to the front burner.
It is such a promising opportunity, that we will fail to
secure it at our peril. I have urged the administration,
privately and in public, to take unilateral to go below START
II levels. Such unilateral initiatives could set the stage
for very deep cuts in weapons systems, and could be
inspirational to those nations that are currently sitting on
the fence as regards their own nuclear futures. The
importance of containing the threat of proliferation, and its
difficulties, can be seen in the debate regarding the
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Many
nations, such as Egypt, appropriate pressed the United States
and the other large nuclear powers to embrace and implement
their responsibilities under Article VI of the NPT and to
secure the adherence to the Treaty of those whose nuclear
arsenals are less developed.
It is potentially catastrophic to our national security to
eschew the opportunity both to reduce significantly the
nuclear threat that we currently face and to forstall the
further proliferation of those threats. By failing to take
such steps we also send clear signals to the Russians and the
Chinese that their nuclear arsenals are prerequisites for
them to maintain their super-power status. In that way we
perpetuate the nuclear danger; and by failing to assume our
Article VI responsibilities, we invite additional regional
instability and new threats to emerge from prospective new
members of the nuclear-weapons club.
For those who worry about this threat to the point of
wishing to revive an expensive anti-ballistic missile
program, with what I believe is very limited utility to
defend the United States from weapons of mass destruction, it
strikes me that preventing the emergence or retention of the
threats that such a system is designed to counter would be a
cautious and cost effective strategy. Scaling back our own
strategic forces would be critical to such a strategy.
Although I believe it is possible to move beyond our
reliance upon the traditional triad of strategic elements--
sea-based missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
bombs dropped from the missiles launched from bombers--one
can also maintain the triad, not have to spend the levels
that are planned for in the administration budget request,
and still move deliberately but cautiously down for force
structure ladder. Obviously at some point, maintaining the
triad, per se, no longer makes sense and we should move
towards the most survivable leg of that triad--our submarine
force.
Making such adjustment could lead to new commitments by the
Russians--who face devastating economic circumstances that
will literally compel them to make savings when they perceive
their strategic interests
[[Page E473]]
allow them to do so--who seem eager to negotiate
reductions beyond the START II goals, and should give the
Chinese reasons to moderate their on-going strategic-
weapons modernization program.
While this constitutes a more determined effort to scale-
back our strategic arsenal than is contemplated by the
administration, it would provide us with a ``hedge'' capacity
in the event of the return of an implacably hostile
relationship with Russia. It would place us on a path that
signaled our willingness to lead the weapons reduction effort
and would set the stage at the end of the five year budget
period to implement a plan to reduce our arsenal to a minimum
sufficient deterrent. This makes the achievement of nuclear
disarmament a feasibility within our lifetimes.
End the Cold War Acquisition Program
With the exception of a temporary reprieve from aggressive
spending on acquisitions that was allowed by the force
structure reductions that have been on-going during this
decade, there has not been a fundamental rethinking of U.S.
acquisition strategy. The administration has proposed that in
this FYDP we will begin to invest significantly in weapons
modernization--feeling that we have reached the limit of
relying on the investment of the last decade. The Republican
majority by both yesterday's technology and moan when they
find they have boxed themselves out of affording the
expensive modernization program the administration supports.
Neither are awaiting the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) that could--and should--dramatically alter the
priorities that were laid down in the Bottom Up Review
undertaken by Secretary Aspin--which will hopefully provide a
careful review of programs such as the F-22, the New Attack
Submarine and others which requirements were conceptualized
during the Cold War.
I believe strongly that we should avoid buying new systems
that maintain the United States and the world on a treadmill
of weapons development. Pressing ahead with such invites an
arms race that we would be well advised to avoid. We should
not fail, as we did in the run-up to MIRV technology, to
realize the opportunity that may be available to turn the
world away from an accelerated escalation in these types of
programs; or we will face much more costly and deadly threats
in the long run.
In addition, we much avoid making purchases of systems that
are excessive, redundant, and are designed to replace systems
that currently work perfectly well because they are far
superior to anything that they confront in a potential
theater and will continue to do so into the mid-term future.
In this regard, we must examine and scale back our ship
purchasing, tactical air craft development, more rationalize
our strategic lift program and various other programs.
The budget savings in these accounts that would be achieved
by the types of cutbacks above are, of course, sometimes
offset by the need to acquire alternative in order to ensure
that the first element of the acquisition requirement of
equipping our force with safe and reliable systems is
satisfied. The amounts of savings I am suggesting can be made
are net adjustments that accommodate for the necessary
acquisition of perfectly suitable current-generations systems
to meet our foreseeable operational needs. This allows us to
resist the temptation to rush new technologies to the
battlefield ahead of requirements, but rests on an assumption
that we will continue to make prudent investments in research
and development.
These more discerning measures of acquisition would allow
us both to lead an effort to slow the level of weapons
systems development, retard weapons sales internationally
(thereby reducing the threats faced by U.S. and coalition
forces), properly equip our forces for the challenges they
will face in the near to mid term, and utilize our scarce
resources to investigate new technologies that will be
more important for the next century. Such a strategy would
make the maximum return on investment, and would
contribute the best to our effort to control the
proliferation of exotic weapons technology.
Properly Sizing U.S. Forces
Properly sizing U.S. forces is also important for ensuring
that we do not place scarce defense resources into the wrong
pots. The Bottom-Up Review's requirement to have forces
sufficient to be able to meet, nearly simultaneously, two
major regional contingencies without allied assistance
exceeds that which was propounded by President Bush's Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney--and exceeds in my judgment a
reasonable planning orientation. It would be my hope that
both the planning assumptions and the forces that emerged
from the BUR will receive serious examination during the QDR.
First, we should relax slightly the pace at which we
believe we would need to respond to a developing crisis. By
more deliberately ``metering'' forces into a theater--enough
to halt aggression and provide for force protection quickly
and then more deliberately once that state is achieved we can
both reduce active force structure and readiness
requirements. In addition, this expands the opportunities of
time during which sanctions, negotiations and other non-
military efforts can reverse the aggression through less than
major armed confrontation. We should bear in mind that
Operation Desert Storm commenced seven months after Iraq
invaded Kuwait. We would establish a planning horizon to
commence counter-offensive military operations more severe
than was undertaken in that conflict.
Second, a change in this pace of operations will allow for
a more effective utilization of reserves, and indeed for
returning more of our force structure to reserve components.
Third, such a change will modify lift requirements, not
only changing force structure but procurement requirements as
well.
Fourth, by changing the view regarding allied
participation, we again can relax our planning requirements
for force structure.
The alternative that I present assumes that additional
force structure reductions and realignments can be
accomplished in all services through a change in these policy
and strategy assumptions, and that these changes will not
compromise our ability to meet our security requirements. It
assumes the careful management of reserve resources and a
continuing determination to work with our allies and others
in coalition efforts. I believe that these modest
adjustments, to be achieved within the FYDP, will leave us
poised to make an assessment early in the next century as to
whether or not we have gone far enough in realigning our
forces to meet the world's new strategic threats.
In addition to these larger changes, other miscellaneous
savings can be achieved by changing how we do business. Of
course, we must realign our priorities within the force in
order to ensure that we have the proper types of units \1\ to
meet the future challenges and change our operating methods
in order to alleviate some of the operational tempo and
personnel tempo problems that have arisen.
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\1\ I think especially of enhancing our abilities with, for
example, AWACs, civic and public affairs units, water
purification units and other types of units that are small,
but for which there will continue to be an elevated level of
demand.
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This issue of operational tempo (optempo), and ultimately
personnel tempo (perstempo), stress has elevated visibility
at the moment. Many blame the stress of deployment to meet
contingencies as placing too great a burden on the shrinking
force structure. However, when you compare the size of the
force with the numbers involved in deployments, I believe
that what is shown is that our ``business as usual'' is out
of kilter and that we have too few of some particular types
of units.
By changing forward presence requirements for aircraft
carriers, for example, we can reduce perstempo stress among
naval forces significantly. And, as was demonstrated by the
prompt movement of carriers from one theater to another when
crises have emerged, such a decision does not diminish our
ability to respond promptly and effectively in order to deter
a crisis from erupting into large-scale violence.
Finally, as we reduce force structure we should be mindful
that better intelligence and assessments can offset the
possibility of strategic surprise. Having said that there are
substantial savings available within the intelligence
accounts that could be achieved through various economies and
they should be vigorously pursued.
The Imaginary Readiness Crisis
Similarly, different scoring for training and an
understanding that training goals are not arbitary standards
that result in catastrophic lack of readiness if they are not
fully met would change some of the discussion as well. Such
an arbitary rating system led to the anecdotal evidence that
there was a readiness crisis at the end of the 1994 fiscal
year. We need to explore how steeply we can and cannot tier
our readiness; we need to ensure that our services are
preparing, as well, for the contingencies that should occupy
them more and more--humanitarian assistance, conflict
resolution, peacekeeping, etc. But, most importantly, by
changing the assumption regarding the pace at which personnel
will flow into a potential conflict, we can achieve
significant savings in training and other readiness
requirements.
In addition, this budget would enhance environmental
cleanup and conversion funds that are critical to the
successful transformation of our defense infrastructure to
civilian use. We cannot walk away from these communities, who
have served the nation, and now want to return to civilian
activities. These funds are vital to the future well-being of
our nation, and to its national security--and they more
easily allow us to close excess infrastructure. We should
continue to plan to pay for them in the years to come.
A Properly Sized Military Budget
In this paper, I have avoided proposing specific
programmatic cuts and have talked more thematically. However,
the numbers presented below represent savings that are built
from real force structure cuts, real acquisition program
termination, from real changes in operation and training
tempos. They have been ``scored'' by CBO to ensure that their
authority and outlay savings were properly measured.
Importantly, they are only one approach to organizing a
properly sized, properly equipped and properly trained force
for the challenges of the 21st Century. Others could choose
different pathways, but they would achieve similar savings.
I felt it important not to get bogged down in a debate over
this or that weapon system, this or that force structure
element or this or that method of operation. Suffice it to
say, if the budget were cut by these levels, we could provide
for a sufficient military
[[Page E474]]
force to defend the United States and its interests,
participate effectively as a world leader in international
affairs and free up resources vitally needed for our other
``national security'' accounts. Our failure to do so will,
as I have indicated elsewhere, be to our long-term
national security detriment. It is with that analytical
framework and in that spirit that I believe we could
achieve these levels of savings in the military account
over the coming five fiscal years:
[In billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority Outlay
Fiscal year savings savings
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1998.......................................... $27.365 $18.761
1999.......................................... 34.713 29.071
2000.......................................... 44.845 36.219
2001.......................................... 48.685 41.818
2002.......................................... 51.630 56.221
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1998-2002..................................... 217.238 172.090
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Let me reiterate my view that these represent savings in
one of three national security accounts, funds that can be
urgently spent in our other two national security accounts:
foreign assistance and domestic programs critical to our
well-being and health as a nation. For without strong healthy
cities to defend, cohesive communities, an educated citizenry
to run our economy and our political institutions, we will
wither and decline socially, politically, economically and
culturally. We are way past due making these investments, and
we fail to make them at our peril. The time is ripe and the
opportunity exists to transfer this scale of resources and we
should not fail to do so as we think of what type of society
and what type of world we seek to build for our children and
their children.
DELLUMS NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET PROPOSAL SAVINGS
[050 Budget authority in billions]
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Fiscal year--
------------------------------------------------------- FH 1998-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002
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050 account--Administration's FY 98 budget
proposal................................... $265.3 $269.2 $275.0 $281.5 $289.1 $1,642.3
Total savings 1998-2002..................... 27.365 34.713 44.845 41.818 51.630 217.238
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DELLUMS NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET PROPOSAL SAVINGS
[050 Outlays in billions]
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Fiscal year--
------------------------------------------------------- FH 1998-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
050 account--Administration's FY 98 budget
proposal................................... $263.0 $266.3 $270.0 $269.0 $269.0 $1,601.4
Total savings 1998-2002..................... 18.761 29.071 36.219 41.818 56.221 172.090
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